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OBSERVATIONS ON THE MAHAWELI GANGA DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, SRI LANKA 
Robert Chambers 
^^EfeDiscussion of R. S. Jayaratne "The Proposed Settlements and the Existing 
~ - Villages in the Mahaweli Development Area" 
and ^ A. Maheswaran "Mahaweli Ganga Development - Project I -
Its Likely Impact on Agricultural Production in Sri Lanka" 
at the Conference "Agriculture in the Economic Development of Sri Lanka", 
organised by the Ceylon Studies Seminar, 
15 - 20 August, 1974, Peradeniya, Sri Lanka. 
'The Mahaweli Project is by far the largest single development project 
in Sri Lanka, Its implementation has been tentatively programmed to cover 
30 years. If fully implemented it would be capable of generating 500MW 
of electricity and providing irrigation water for 900,000 acres, of which, 
however, 246,000 already receive some irrigation water. To clear up a 
confusing inconsistency, the generally agreed usage for describing the 
sequence of implementation is that there are phases, projects and stages. 
In the first Phase there are three Projects, and Project I has three Stages• 
We are concerned primarily with Stage I which is already being implemented, 
and Stage II for which financial negotiations are well advanced. It is 
anticipated that the outcome of the first three stages will be (apart from 
hydroelectric benefits): 
Stage I: 120,000 acres which are already being irrigated will 
receive additional irrigation water. 
Stage II: 70,000 new acres will receive irrigation water, and 
27,000 acres which are already irrigated will receive 
additional water. 
Stage III: 30,000 acres under the Kaudulla and Kantalai reservoirs 
will receive water. 
In my remarks I shall be concerned not only with these stages but with 
some aspects of the development project as a whole and in the longer-term. 
The two papers deal respectively with settlement policy and with the 
likely impact of Project I on agricultural production in Sri Lanka. 
SETTLEMENT 
My remarks on Jayaratne's paper will be brief as settlement 
will be considered in more detail later in .the conference. ^ He is 
concerned with settlement in Stage II, particularly at Kandalama 
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and Kala Oya where about 70,000 acres are to be provided with 
irrigation water. In these areas there will be both new 
settlement and also old purana settlements to be incorporated 
into the new system. 
The proposals for policy and procedures for new settlement 
apje ar sensible and humane., The adoption of individual family 
holdings avoids the tempting pitfalls of ideological utopianism 
and recognises the wisdom of giving settlers a form of tenure 
and economy which they are likely to want «, Relying on the 
initiative of settlers themselves should also avoid the worst 
excesses of the dependence syndromes which so commonly raise the 
costs and reduce the benefits of settlement programmes. 
The proposals for incorporating existing purana lands into 
the new irrigation system are noteworthy for introducing a 
small-scale land reform,, As the author points out, they do not 
involve very large areas; but they may prove to be important 
testing grounds to identify the potential and problems of an 
equalising land reform on paddy lands. The proposal is to acquire 
the land compulsorily from the owners with compensation but then 
later to give them preferential consideration for "the alienation 
of new allotments if they are otherwise eligible to receive lands". 
This will presumably mean that those with small paddy holdings 
will receive more land, and those with large holdings will receive 
less, all ending up with "an equal extent of land and . <, . equal 
opportunities for self-advancement". This procedure involves 
moral and practical questions. The experience gained from it should 
be a national asset for future policy-making, and it might be useful 
if the process could be monitored and evaluated. 
Finally, the proposals in the paper, as so often with settle-
ment procedures, balance with a mixture of delicacy and awkwardness 
on the scale between compulsion and consent. For example, one 
wonders what the reality will be that follows from the observation 
that residence and plot selection "are expected to be left to 
(settlers) with a certain amount of direction; of course". It is 
the humanity and self-restraint with which that "certain amount 
of direction" is exercised or abstained from that is one of the 
most difficult parts of settlement for anyone in a managerial 
position. 
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THE IMPACT OF PROJECT I 
Maheswaran's paper and its supplement discuss the possible 
impact of Project I on Sri Lanka's agricultural development and 
through this on economic development. This is a huge and 
complex subject with many imponderables and anyone who has to 
attempt to cover it in a short paper deserves sympathy. However, 
the conclusion that Project I was justified "to produce the 
food requirements of the country" is not, to my mind, effectively 
substantiated either by the authority of the UNDP/FAO study's 
finding that Project I would give the best returns, or by the 
evidence presented in this paper. Much more detail of the costs 
and benefits of the Project would be needed to arrive at this 
conclusion, including a serious consideration of alternatives to 
the Mahaweli Ganga Development Project as a whole. Moreover the 
benefit estimates appear highIf^national consumption is running 
at around 90 million bushelsjjana production at around 65 million 
bushels, it cannot be expected that Project I will close the gap 
of 25 million bushels. The figure given in the paper is about 
16 million bushels from the three stages of Project I, HftllwuL.appears 
a high estimate, based as it is at least in part on projected 
production of 90 - 100 bushels of paddy per acre. In any case, by 
the time that production is forthcoming, the growing population 
will have increased demand substantially. In terms of national 
self-sufficiency, Mahaweli Ganga looks more like a holding operation 
which may prevent the gap widening rather than a means of closing it. 
GENERAL COMMENTS 
Four sets of comments seem worth making. 
(i) Economic "feasibility" 
The paper by Maheswaran states that "the economic and technical 
feasibility of the project has been established". The technical 
feasibility is not in dispute. But it is rather difficult to 
know what economic feasibility can mean. It is perhaps best divided 
into two expressions - financial feasibility, meaning whether or not 
the necessary funds can be raised, and economic desirability, 
meaning whether from a wider economic point of view the project is 
_ 4 -
justified,, These are two different things. It may be possible, 
indeed it often is with government projects, to raise or find 
money to finance them when from a strictly economic angle they 
are less desirable than alternative uses of those funds„ We are 
told in the paper that Stage I has been fully financed and 
Stage II partly financed. But the question of greater interest 
and importance is whether or to what extent Mahaweli Ganga is 
justified economically. 
Many hard questions need to be asked and answered before 
one can say that a major project is economically justified. It is 
not enough to quote an official internal rate of return since it 
is so common even in the most respectable circles for internal 
rates of return to be fiddled to produce the answers that are 
wanted. In the case of Mahaweli Ganga some of the hard questions 
are : 
- what are the estimated recurrent costs? Uda Walawe, I believe, 
costs about RslO million a year just to keep running, quite apart 
from development costs. If some 25,000 acres are irrigated (the 
target is over twice this figure), this means a recurrent cost 
from government of no less than Rs400 per acre per annum merely to 
keep the project operating. It is difficult to know how to remove 
the persistent blind spot in economic evaluations which fail 
adequately if at all to anticipate recurrent commitments of this 
sort and which fail adequately to include them in the discounting 
of future cost flows as part of the calculation of the internal 
rate of return. So the questions are: what recurrent costs are 
anticipated for Mahaweli Ganga (in the employment of staff, in 
maintenance, in vehicles, in subsidies to settlers, etc.), and have 
they been taken into account in calculating the internal rate of 
return of 12 per cent? 
what provision has there been for cost escalation? There seems 
to be a paradoxical law that the larger the project, the larger is 
the proportion of unanticipated costs to original estimates. One 
may perhaps be forgiven for asking whether Mahaweli Ganga might 
not become Sri Lanka's Concorde. 
what provision has there been for the avoidance of the mistakes 
made on Gal Oya and Uda Walawe? It would be tedious to recite the 
catalogue of criticisms in the Gal Oya Evaluation Report, or to 
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labour the difficulties which have beset Uda Walawe through the 
irrigation for a paddy crop of land with high percolation rates, 
or to emphasise the unresolved problems of water control and 
management which both projects still face. But if such 
difficulties are to be avoided in the construction and operation 
of Mahaweli Ganga, deliberate provision has to be made. 
is there an economist or a team of economists responsible for 
continuous reappraisals of the desirability of the next steps in 
the programme, whatever they may be, in the light of the very 
rapidly changing economic situation both within Sri Lanka and in 
the world? And if so, does he or do they have the degree of 
detachment needed to be able to turn their thumbs down when 
necessary? And if they do turn their thumbs down, how likely is 
that to be effective? 
(ii) Thinking about water 
There is a persistent and quite extraordinary gap in thinking 
when it comes to water. The three volumes of the Final Report 
of the UNDP/FAO on Mahaweli Ganga present a striking demonstration 
of this gap. Apart from the hydroelectric aspects, the justification 
for the Mahaweli Ganga Project is that it will increase agricultural 
production through the provision of additional water for irrigation. 
The Report states that in the area under command, although 1.5 million 
acres are suitable and available for irrigation, water is only 
sufficient for 0.9 million acres. The immediate and obvious 
implication is that water is a scarcer resource than land and that 
the sparing use of water through good water management will be 
critical ain determining production benefits. Yet the Report gives 
less than one page to the organisational aspects of water control, 
while devoting an average of eight pages each to four other concerns -
the supply if inputs; marketing; agricultural credit and co-operatives; 
and agricultural research, extension and education. It would have 
been far, far more useful if it had given space to considering how 
returns to scarce water could have been improved; and in particular 
the detailed organisational and operating details needed for the 
sparing issue and application of water. 
It is understandable that the paper by Maheswaran should follow 
the distinguished international team of UNDP/FAO experts along the 
path which they so authoritatively blazed in the wrong direction. 
The paper states, for example, that "The cropping patterns in the 
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new areas specially will depend on the types of soil and the 
marketing conditions operating at any point of time". This is 
sensible as far as it goes. But the cropping pattern should 
also depend on returns to water, which is not mentioned. Nor 
is it likely to be entirely justifiable, democratic and 
permissive though one may wish to be, to say that "As a wide 
range of crops is possible, the farmer will be able to so choose 
his crops as to get the best returns for himself". The diverted 
water of Mahaweli Ganga represents a huge national investment and 
it is at best questionable whether farmers should be entirely 
free to choose crops with low yield:water ratios when crops with 
higher yieldrwater ratios are available. If one must revert to 
thinking in terms of land, the point is that water saved is land-
augmenting; and water used profligately, is land-dissipating. 
Sparing water management and the choice of water-sparing crops 
should be a path towards irrigating larger areas, towards higher 
cropping indices, towards benefiting more people, and towards 
higher national food production. 
The experience with large projects so far has been that water 
control is permissive and wasteful, and that the acreages irrigated 
are smaller than anticipated. This has been the case both on Gal 
Oya and on Uda Walawe where some foresee a serious shortfall in 
the acreage that can be irrigated. The question has to be asked 
what arrangements, if any, are being made to avoid the 
wasteful permissiveness of water issues on Gal Oya and Uda Walawe? 
What reason is there to believe that the experience with Mahaweli 
Ganga will be any different? And if it is not different, what will 
the effects be on the acreage served with water, the production 
resulting from it, and the numbers of people who can find a 
reasonable living through agriculture in the area served? 
(iii) The large project trap 
There is a persistent danger, and not by any means only in 
Sri Lanka, of what I hope I can without disrespect call the 
Parakrama Bahu complex. It is more exciting, more satisfying, and 
easier to muster special efforts for works of construction than it 
is to manage their operation once constructed. Moreover, as 
Parakrama Bahu the Great no doubt knew only too well, construction 
is more prestigious and more likely to immortalise the names of 
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those responsible. Big projects quickly become irreversible. 
They develop momentum, attract commitment and enthusiasm, 
generate new jobs, and become identified by many people with 
their personal interests. It would be churlish to suggest that 
the motives of those who become committed are merely self-
regarding. For engineers in particular the opportunities are 
creative. As men do with women, so also engineers and others 
with projects pass through stages of sceptical appraisal, 
flirtation, day-dreaming, falling in love, becoming wed, and 
finally adorning their beloved with objects of unquestionable 
beauty and high cost but of doubtful productive value. But for 
all the creative aspects, the vested interests attracted to and 
supported by large projects cannot be ignored. If a country has 
a surplus of engineers who exceed the jobs available, there will 
be an especially strong pressure for construction projects, and 
a correspondingly strong resistance to winding them down or 
phasing them out. There are some very human aspects of 
irreversibility„ 
Albert Hirschman, in his characteristically provocative 
book Development Projects Observed, has presented the doctrine 
of the Hiding Hand. According to this, habitual underestimates 
of the difficulties which projects will face are offset by 
compensating habitual underestimates of the creativity which 
can be mustered to overcome them. This is a neat, attractive 
and persuasive concept. He goes further and argues that one 
of the weaknesses of agricultural projects is that they are 
easier to abandon than industrial projects, and consequently 
may be abandoned prematurely before they have called forth the 
creativity which might make them do better. A grave weakness 
of this set of ideas is the high cost of "creativity". In 
practice this rather innocent word means higher capital costs, 
higher recurrent costs, subsidies, and further drains on scarce 
resources with high opportunity costs like specialised manpower -
these together often amounting to a heavy charge on the national 
budget and the taxpayer. With Mahaweli Ganga as with other 
large projects, it is right to ask questions about the costs of 
this sort of creativity and about irreversibility, and to ask how 
and with what costs a halt can be called to construction and 
related activities as and when it seems right. 
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In this respect, Mahaweli Ganga has the strongest advantage 
of being much more divisible than some other projects. In 
Maheswaran's words "Each phase consists of several projects and 
implementation could be in stages in separate units without 
prejudice to subsequent developments". The questions then are -
is there a hatchet machinery which can stop the flow of phases, 
projects and their stages? Is it powerful enough to operate? 
What vested interests, if that is not too pejorative an expression, 
might resist such a decision? How, if necessary could they be 
overcome? 
A final aspect of the large project trap is the inertia of 
special organisations set up at the development and settlement 
stages. This may apply particularly to engineering, settlement 
and extension staff. Heavy staffing becomes less necessary as 
construction and settlement are completed. But the parent 
organisation finds itself with its own resettlement problem for 
its staff. The easiest solution is a sequence of further projects 
to employ the same people: in Britain, Blue Streak followed by 
TSR 2 followed by Concorde; in Sri Lanka, is it too fanciful to 
draw a parallel in Gal Oya followed by Uda Walawe followed by 
Mahaweli Ganga? 
(iv) Opportunities to innovate 
Although the tenor of these remarks has been generally critical, 
I should like to end on a positive note. Large projects present 
challenges which sometimes call forth great efforts and imaginations, 
I do not mean to undervalue the work which has gone into the 
Mahaweli Ganga Project nor the vision and application which have 
brought it to its present point. Rather I should like to urge 
that the opportunities which it presents, for as long as it is 
being implemented, should be adequately exploited. Perhaps the 
greatest opportunity is to innovate. A partially independent Board 
with its own organisation has chances to try out new forms of 
organisation and new procedures which it might be much more difficult 
for ordinary government departments to undertake. The experience 
gained with consolidation of paddy fields, as described by 
Jayaratne in his paper, is a case in point. Perhaps other new 
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departures should be tried. And perhaps the most important 
of all would be to design, test and replicate management systems 
for water, concentrating on the management of the people who 
manage the water; for if water management on major irrigation 
could be made much more efficient through methods developed in 
the relative freedom of Mahaweli Ganga, and if those methods could 
be spread through major irrigation in Sri Lanka, the benefits 
might even be greater than those which derive directly from the 
Mahaweli Ganga Project itself. 
November 1974 
